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Aims and scope
1 This paper outlines the broad contours of the DRC conflict in international, national and
local terms, thus providing a full context in which to understand the Inter-Congolese
Dialogue (ICD) that took place in Sun City, South Africa, in early 2002. Focusing on eastern
DRC,  the paper highlights  a  kaleidoscope of  conflicts  and ever-shifting alliances,  and
reflects on the challenges ahead if peace is to be restored1.
 
Background: conflicts in the DRC
2 The current problems of the DRC stem «from the wave of violence and mass-displacement
unleashed by the Rwandan genocide in 1994» (APPG 2001: 6). Following the refugee exodus of
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1994, which harboured the forces responsible for the genocide (Interahamwe, ex-FAR)
and made Rwanda's western border insecure, the Rwandan government masterminded
the 1996 Banyamulenge/Tutsi-led rebellion in eastern Zaire in an attempt to stop the
threat of insurgency. Uganda, too, backed the rebellion, as did Burundi. Known as the
Banyamulenge uprising,  this  rebellion culminated in the speedy overthrow of  Zaire's
president Mobutu Sese Seko. The backers' first choice for Mobutu's replacement, Laurent-
Desire  Kabila,  initially  appeared  as  the best  possible  alternative,  perhaps  even  as  a
«beacon of hope» in the pantheon of African Renaissance leaders, but Kabila soon proved
he was made of sterner stuff.
3 Although put in charge of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-
Zaire  (ADFL)  through  the  mediation  of  presidents  Museveni  (Uganda)  and  Kagame
(Rwanda), Kabila faced problems on taking up the reins of power. First, there was the
problem of the sponsors who had financed the ADFL campaign. During the campaign,
mining companies from the US, Canada, Australia and South Africa had signed contracts
with the ADFL. Kabila did not honour the contracts. At the end of the campaign, Kabila «
played  competition  between  these  [mining]  companies  for  more  payoff,  leading  to  tensions
between [American Mineral Fields, AMF] and the Kabila regime» (Ngolet 2000: 75, based on
Reno 1998).  On cancelling the AMF's contracts,  Kabila created tremendous frustration
among the company's agents.
4 Second, the Kabila-Banyamulenge partnership became irreparably strained when the new
leader gave in to the popular feeling among Congolese that Kabila had been enthroned by
foreigners.  Since  popular  opinion  rarely  distinguishes  between  Banyarwanda,
Banyamulenge and Rwandan nationals, many Congolese demanded that Kabila demote
his Banyamulenge comrades.  Seeing «Tutsi» administrators installed at every level of
civil  and military administration,  Congolese citizens insisted on their removal.  Kabila
then ordered «the Rwandans» home, while Banyamulenge were told to return to the
marginalised position reserved for Tutsi since the demise of Bartholomy Bisengimana, the
Tutsi adviser who under Mobutu directed the Bureau of the Presidency of the Republic
from  1969  until  1977  (details  in  Pottier  2002).  The  widespread  perception  that
Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge were all «Rwandans», one may argue, was a major cause
in the renewed fighting in Congo in August 1998.
5 After  he  gave  his  marching  orders,  Kabila  adopted  Mobutu-style ethnic  politics  and
substituted fellow Katangese,  including relatives,  for  the  Tutsi  he  had removed.  The
«sacked» Banyamulenge soldiers, however, defied the order to lay down their arms and in
February  1998  «took  refuge  in  Remera  and  Itombwe  [eastern  DRC]  with  their  arsenals» 
(Garreton Report,  10  September 1998).  Similarly,  when Kabila  removed Banyarwanda
from his  government (among them Bizima Karaha,  the Foreign Affairs  Minister)  and
ordered  high-ranking  Rwandan  military  to  return  to  Rwanda,  few  Banyamulenge/
Rwandan soldiers actually left the country. This explains why the Second Rebellion, the
mutiny of 2 August 1998, began first in Kinshasa and then, within days, in eastern DRC.
The mutiny aimed to depose Kabila and hand power to the Tutsi-dominated Congolese
Movement  for  Democracy  (CMD),  precursor  to  the  Rassemblement  congolais  pour  la
democratie (RCD). Rebel leaders stated that Kabila had faltered on his promise to hand the
province of Kivu to Banyamulenge2. Rightly complaining that Kabila had never attempted
to resolve the Banyamulenge identity question,  the mutineers,  supported by Rwanda,
Burundi and some 20,000 former Mobutu soldiers liberated from rehabilitation camps,
came very  close  to  taking  power  in  Kinshasa,  but  they  were  repelled  by  the  timely
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intervention of SADC troops from Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia. The DRC is a member
of SADC. In contrast to the failure to take Kinshasa, the mutiny in the east was more
successful: with the help of Rwanda and to a lesser extent Burundi, the Banyamulenge
rebels («Banyamulenge» being a hold-all category) managed to control North and South
Kivu in matter of days.
6 On a country by country basis, the reasons for the SADC intervention varied. Like Rwanda
and Uganda, Angola had security interests in a stable DRC, which under Mobutu (and
even under Kabila) had given sanctuary to UNITA, the main adversary of Angola's ruling
MPLA. Angola's leaders, however, took several days before making up their minds. Early
on in  the  mutiny,  Angola  seemed to  want  to  support  the  eastern rebels,  because  of
Kabila's tolerance toward dissident UNITA troops. Later, when these UNITA troops were
seen to be siding with the Banyamulenge rebels, Angola's leader, Dos Santos, chose to
support Kabila after all3. The irony is that Angola would have backed Rwanda's plan to
topple  Kabila4.  Namibia  and  Zimbabwe,  unlike  Angola,  could  not  claim to  have  any
problem securing their borders; their motives for sending in troops were more personal.
Mugabe and his  family entourage had economic interests  in the DRC;  they benefited
enormously from the contracts Kabila had signed with the Zimbabwe-based New African
Investments consortium. Although challenged at home5, Mugabe sent 600 elite troops to
help Kabila stifle the revolt. Namibia's support as an «allied force» was equally driven by
personal  interests  and  friendship  on  the  part  of  its  president,  Sam  Nujoma.  These
interests centred on the presence in the DRC of certain multinationals and security firms.
In Namibia, too, the deployment of troops was contested6. Somewhat later, Sudan and
Chad also sent troops to help Kabila.
7 The events of  August  1998 were something of  a  re-run of  the first  rebellion.  Just  as
«Rwandans»  had  spearheaded  the  ADFL  campaign,  so  the  Second  Rebellion  was
orchestrated  from  within  Rwanda  in  support  of  the  «sacked»  Banyamulenge/Tutsi/
Rwandan  (from  here  on  «Banyamulenge»)  military  officers  and  administrators.  The
motive, once again, was Rwanda's (and Uganda's) need for a regime in Kinshasa that
would bring economic and political stability. Uganda's border security had not improved
since Kabila seized power; the Ugandan ADF rebels, supported by the regime in Sudan,
still  operated  freely  in  North  Kivu.  These  rebels  often  organised  cross-border  raids
alongside ex-FAR and Interahamwe troops. Ugandan troops arrived in eastern DRC within
ten days of the start of the rebellion.
8 There  were  other  aspects  to  the  deja-vu  situation:  internal  contradictions,  and  the
ambivalent position of local Mayi-Mayi militias. Being neither entirely home-grown nor
entirely foreign, the DRC's Second Rebellion was right from the start marked as having
opposed tendencies within its  fold.  The chief  contradiction involved the chair of  the
Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD), Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, who opposed
the rebellion's  militarist  tendency (Mamdani  1998).  Wamba,  a  Congolese professor of
history at Dar es Salaam University, and the RCD military top made it clear that their
priorities differed. When the Second Rebellion got under way, there was only a military
system in  place;  political  leaders  like  Wamba dia  Wamba and Arthur  Z'ahidi  Ngoma
(former UNESCO employee) appeared on the scene some two weeks later. As a scholar
committed to political reform and transparency, Wamba did not hide that «there was still a
rift between us [political reformists] and the military wing of RCD»7, but he hoped «that those
in favour of political liberation of the people would eventually gain advantage in the movement» 
(cited, Mamdani 1998).
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9 For his part, the RCD commander in Goma referred to the possibility that the military
might become dissatisfied with Wamba's insistence on putting reform before conquest.
10 The tension between Wamba and the militarists would never be resolved, and led to a
predictable split. We first hear of the split on 6 April 1999 when it is reported that RCD
president Wamba has moved from Goma to Kisangani because of «a certain malaise»8.
Wamba supporters  who joined  his  breakaway  group included  Mbusa  Nyamwisi  (RCD
Chairman), Jacques Depelchin (former academic and RCD rapporteur) and Lunda Bululu.
Nyamwisi,  who  later  challenged  Wamba  for  the  leadership  of  the  breakaway  group
(referred to as RCD-Kisangani or RCD-ML), said the militarists were opposed to a united
front against Kabila. Those who remained with the RCD (soon to be renamed RCD-Goma)
then  accused  the  Ugandan  military  of  splitting  their  movement  and  encouraging
Wamba's faction to join forces with Jean-Pierre Bemba's MLC. Bemba's rebel movement,
relatively new, had been launched from within Uganda with Museveni's support allegedly
to counter Rwanda's growing influence within RCD9.
11 After Wamba's ousting, the RCD movement appointed Emile Ilunga as its new leader.
(Jean-Pierre  Ondekane  and  Moise  Nyarugabo  stayed  on  as  first  and  second  vice-
presidents.) The change at the top caused Deo Safari, DRC embassy official in Nairobi, to
comment that Wamba's departure «Casts a shadow on the negotiation process». RCD's
new leaders, he added, were «puppets» of Rwanda's then vice-president Paul Kagame,
who was «hiding  behind the  rebellion  to  achieve  his  plan to  occupy our  country»10.  In the
following days and months, Wamba dia Wamba supporters, backed by Ugandan troops,
got involved in shoot-outs with RCD-Goma, whose territory stretches up to Kisangani.
Running battles continued until early June, when we get the first hint of an MLC (Bemba)
merger with RCD-Kisangani (Wamba), through the mediation of Uganda. It is reported
that some 30 ex-FAZ generals (Mobutu generals) were in Kampala at the time ready to
join the merger11.
12 Looking ahead to the IC Dialogue of early 2002, we note that the rebel factions in eastern
Congo are always interested in the prospect of new political alliances. Wamba «left» the
RCD because he was, at least initially, in favour of a rapprochement with Bemba (MLC).
When  he  decided  against  merging,  Wamba  became  marginalised  within  his  own
movement; he was succeeded by Mbusa Nyamwisi, who signed a merger agreement on 1
January 2001. The agreement, however, was never successful and fizzled out in a matter
of months.
 
Confusing local wars: Mayi-Mayi, Banyamulenge and
«negative forces»
13 Having sketched the broad contours of «the big war», we must now examine the highly
complex situation in eastern DRC, where «local» and cross-border conflicts are enmeshed.
In this situation, the restlessness of Mayi-Mayi and other armed groups (a.k.a. «negative
forces») is a particular source of mayhem and confusion. This confusion, I argue, was
there right from the onset of the Second Rebellion when it emerged that «the Mayi-Mayi»
was  a  highly  diverse  category.  The confusing contradiction in  August  1998  was  that
certain Mayi-Mayi groups in South Kivu sided with the rebel/Rwandan movement, much
like they had done in late 1996 (Pottier 1999),  while others did not.  Around Bukavu,
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certain Mayi-Mayi troops (and ex-FAZ) joined the RCD rebels;  in other parts of  Kivu,
Mayi-Mayi and RCD rebels clashed head on.
14 Contradiction and confusion reached a  climax in early 1999 when tension broke out
between Rwandan leaders and «the Banyamulenge» they had supported since the launch
of  the  ADFL  campaign.  In  the  wake  of  this  tension,  it  was  reported  that  some  100
Banyamulenge in South Kivu had been slaughtered by Mayi-Mayi allegedly «in the pay»
of Rwanda. The claim, widely heard in Uvira12, ran counter to the more common scenario
in  which  Mayi-Mayi  attacked  RCD/Rwandan  military  convoys  transporting  precious
minerals towards Rwanda13.  The latter type of attack frequently led to the retaliatory
mass killing of suspected Mayi-Mayi and the civilians thought to harbour them. In the
first quarter of 1999, RCD troops in South Kivu killed thousands of civilians in cold blood,
often wiping out entire communities14.
15 Confusion  regarding  the  loyalty  of  certain  Mayi-Mayi  troops,  and  regarding  the
relationship between Banyamulenge and Rwanda, persisted and grew when anonymous
sources  in  eastern  DRC  informed  the  media  of  a  strategic  plan  according  to  which
«Banyamulenge» and the Rwandan military had come to «an agreement  concerning the
division of power in Kivu. The plan involved the killing of all foreign missionaries, intellectuals and
businessmen  ...  These  killings  were  to  coincide  with  the  staging  of  faked  hostilities  between
Banyamulenge and the Rwandan Tutsi [in charge of eastern DRC], who would then be ‘forced’ to
leave the Congo. This would give Banyamulenge the opportunity to demonstrate to Kabila ... that
they [were] truly Congolese and worthy to participate in any future peace talks»15.
16 At this point,  diplomats were busy preparing for a peace summit in Lusaka.  But real
tension between Banyamulenge and Rwanda also existed by now. This confirmed that
«the Banyamulenge» were indeed not a unified group. It was thus that Müller Ruhimbika
launched the Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes (FDF) and accused Rwanda and the RCD of not
defending Banyamulenge interests.  On 10 December 2001,  Umueseso,  a Kigali  weekly,
interviewed Ruhimbika. He spoke of a split community in which the major division was
between those  «Seeking  jobs  ...  and  those  in  favour  of  a  solution  [to  the  Banyamulenge
problem] which does not involve Rwanda». The two wars in the Congo, he said, were «the
Kagame-Kabila  one,  which  is  an  economically  motivated  war,  and  the  ethnic  one  opposing
Banyamulenge  and  their  [Congolese]  neighbours»16. In  short,  neither  Banyamulenge  nor
Mayi-Mayi  were  homogenous  entities  —  a  fact  that  added  significantly  to  the  local
complexities found within «the big war».
17 To further complicate the picture, some Banyamulenge and Mayi-Mayi factions were also
actively seeking peace. IRIN reported on one such initiative: «The rapprochement between
Banyamulenge from the Gitoga area and Mayi-Mayi from the Kalungwe area came after a meeting
on 17 February brokered by the Banyamulenge NGO Groupe Milima. The NGO, in a statement sent
to IRIN on Friday [23 April 1999], claimed that a Mayi-Mayi commander Thomas Ndagazwa said
he  had  been  'plunged  into  a  pointless  war'.  The  meeting,  between  the  traditionally  hostile
communities,  was made possible as a result  of  members of  Ndagazwa's family living safely in
Banyamulenge controlled area, the report said. Groupe Milima also announced another peace
meeting  in  Lubuga  in  late  March  between  Banyamulenge,  Babembe,  Bafulero  and  Banyindu
communities»17.
18 But not all encounters raised hope. Some Mayi-Mayi caused such immeasurable terror
and suffering that entire populations, Banyamulenge as well as so-called autochthones,
fled in despair. This happened, for instance, in late May and early June 1999 when a group
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of Mayi-Mayi advanced on Uvira causing thousands to flee across Lake Tanganyika18. This
Mayi-Mayi group reportedly fought alongside Burundian rebels from the Forces pour la
Défense de la Démocratie (FDD), who frequently clashed with RCD troops19.
19 In North Kivu, too, the run-up to the Lusaka agreement of 1999 was marked by several
internal  conflicts.  Despite  the  rapprochement  between  some  Mayi-Mayi  and
Banyamulenge in South Kivu, it was reported for North Kivu that Mayi-Mayi «warlords»
were «recruiting ex-FAR and Interahamwe in the  province»,  a trend which weakened the
position of  traditional  chiefs20.  Here,  too,  Mayi-Mayi attacked not only RCD/Rwandan
military convoys, but also Congolese Hutu.
20 Other conflicts-within-the-conflict included a dispute over land rights between Lendu
and Hema near the town of Bunia, i.e. in the zone controlled by RCD-Kisangani. This so-
called ethnic  conflict  left  7,000 dead and 180,000 displaced over  a  period of  just  six
months. According to Amnesty International, Hema armed groups carried out «a campaign
to drive Lendu from their homes in the Ituri region, which is rich in mineral wealth»21. When the
fighting flared up again in January 2001, Amnesty accused Uganda of stage-managing the
conflict for the sake of mineral resource extraction.
21 Amidst all this suffering, displacement and confusion, international efforts got under way
in 1999 to broker a cease-fire. The efforts resulted in the July 1999 Lusaka peace accord,
the corner stone for the later Inter-Congolese Dialogue.
 
The 1999 Lusaka Accord: moving closer to peace?
22 The  first  international  peace  initiative  came  when  Libyan  president  Colonel  Gaddafi
brokered an agreement involving Kabila and Museveni. Signed in Sirte in April 1999, but
without any of the rebel groups represented, the accord was no more than a first small
step or, as Uganda's Foreign Affairs Minister called it, «Simply a statement of our desires —
what we would like to happen in Congo»22. Next, the rebel groups and their foreign backers
met in Kabale, Uganda, following a failed attempt by Kenyan president Arap Moi to switch
the peace talks to Nairobi. Although Bizima Karaha (RCD) announced that «The differences
we have are small»23, RCD-Goma pulled out of these talks and demanded that the ousted
Wamba dia Wamba, now heading the rival RCD-ML, not participate in the negotiations24.
RCD-Goma resented Wamba's  declaration of  an autonomous province in lturi  District
(Province Oriental), which it regarded as an act of «balkanisation». Wamba's faction took
a different view. Political council rapporteur Depelchin declared: «Our understanding is
that each group can sign [in Lusaka]. That was the agreement». Depelchin asked the facilitator
of the Lusaka meeting(s) not to fall into the trap set by RCD-Goma, who was trying to
create a fait accompli25. The squabble coincided with Laurent-Desire Kabila objecting to the
rebels being signatories to a ceasefire draft document, because they did not represent
sovereign states.
23 Just days before the Lusaka Agreement was due for signing, Bemba (MLC) announced the
capture of Gbadolite following a fierce battle with Kabila troops, Sudanese forces and
Interahamwe26. It seemed that the rebel groups, whether or not they intended to sign,
had their minds set firmly on territorial gains. RCD-Goma vowed to take Mbuji-Mayi and
push on to Kinshasa. The objective, commander Ondekane said, «remains the liberation of
the whole country»27.  RCD-Goma was confident about the Lusaka talks, but warned that
Kabila  must  stop  coming  up  with  «fanciful  conditions».  Meanwhile,  reliable  reports
Everybody needs good neighbours: understanding the conflict(s) in Eastern DRC
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, 2 | 2014
6
confirmed that Rwandan soldiers were being trucked into Bukavu, where they divided
«into two convoys: one northwest towards Bunyakiri and the other southwest in the direction of
Walungu»28. Peace was discussed without any let up in the hostilities between rebel groups
and DRC government forces.
24 What about the so-called «negative forces»? Excluded from the peace talks, Mayi-Mayi let
it be known that they would not honour any ceasefire agreement made «in Lusaka 'as long
as the autochthonous people [were] ... under foreign occupation and agression'. In a statement
received  ...  by  IRIN,  the  'politico-military  council'  of  the  Forces  Mayi  Mayi  —  Forces
d'autodéfense populaires (FAP) said the DRC's problems should be handled by the Congolese
themselves. The statement also warned that any attack against rebel groups, which it described as
‘freedom  fighters’  combating  the  Burundian,  Rwandan  and  Ugandan  governments  would  be
'tantamount to attacking Forces Mayi-Mayi and the latter would not hesitate to fight back'. The
statement furthermore condemned the rejection by 'some participants' at the Lusaka talks of the
'rational and principled Sirte accord' in favour of a ' pro-West-Mandela-Tutsi-minority sponsored
plan'. The statement was signed by Mayi-Mayi commander Dunia Lwengama and 'member of the
politico-military council', Litambola Tambwe Vincent»29.
25 Litambola Tambwe was possibly referring here to a plan Thabo Mbeki had proposed when
suggesting that «the belligerents themselves should be the peacekeepers and 'police themselves'
once a ceasefire and troop standstill is agreed, but under the authority of the OAU»30. This plan,
which indeed sounded like a victory for the Rebels/Tutsi/the West, proved acceptable to
no one.
26 Despite appeals by the EU and the US to the governments of Rwanda and Uganda, asking
them to «use their influence» on RCD and MLC to convince them to sign, the Lusaka
agreement was reached without rebel signatures. One day after the signing, Rwanda and
DRC already traded accusations  of  a  ceasefire  violation,  while  the  MLC rebel  faction
moved towards Zongo and caused 4,000 refugees to flee to the Central African Republic.
Soon Bemba (MLC) would complain that Kabila's forces were bombing Gbadolite (now the
headquarters  of  MLC),  and  other  places  like  Kabinda  in  Kasai-Oriental  and  Ikela  in
Equateur.
 
The Lusaka Agreement: key points
27 The accord may be summarised as follows (quoting IRIN on 21July 1999):
28 — Military hostilities and acts of violence against civilians must end within 24 hours of
the signing of the accord.
29 —  A  Joint  Military  Commission  (JMC)  is  to  be  established  within  one  week.  The
commission will include two representatives from each of the belligerent parties who
sign the Accord. Its duties will include «investigating reported ceasefire violations, working out
mechanisms  to  disarm  militia  groups,  verifying  the  disarmament  of  Congolese  civilians,  and
monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces».
30 — The UN will deploy an «appropriate» peacekeeping force, which will «take necessary
measures to ensure compliance [with the accord], collect weapons from civilians, and schedule
and supervise the withdrawal of all foreign forces, in collaboration with the JMC and the OAU».
31 —  The  following  «armed  groups»  are  to  be  disarmed:  the  Rwandan  ex-Far  and
Interahamwe, the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Lord's Resistance Army
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(LRA) and West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), the Ugandan National Rescue Front II (UNRF II),
the  Former  National  Ugandan Army (FUNA),  the  Burundian  Forces  de  Défense  pour  la
Démocratie (FDD) and Angola's UNITA.
32 —  Forty-five  days  after  the  agreement  is  signed,  the  DRC  government,  RCD,  MLC,
unarmed DRC opposition groups and Congolese civil society must enter a 6-week period
of  open  political  negotiations  to  culminate  in  the  setting  up  of  a  new  political
dispensation in the DRC. Subsequently, the national army is to be restructured to include
the armies of DRC, RCD and MLC.
33 — In addition, hostages and prisoners of war are to be released/exchanged, the DRC state
administration is to be re-established, the rights of ethnic groups within the DRC are to
be protected, the security concerns of the DRC and its neighbours are to be addressed.
34 The  circumstances  surrounding  the  signing  of  the  Lusaka  Agreement, marked  by
continued military provocation and exclusions from the negotiating table,  gave little
hope the accord would be implemented. Moreover, the confrontations became more self-
funding. This happened both on the side of the rebels and their backers and on that of the
so-called «invited» troops from Zimbabwe,  Namibia  and Angola.  Self-funding became
possible thanks to the relentless plunder of the DRC's natural resources.
35 As space does not allow an elaborate discussion of the illegal exploitation of the DRC's
natural resources, let me quote from IRIN's summary of the investigative report by the
UN panel that Kofi Annan appointed following a request by the Security Council. IRIN:
«The report lists five key minerals — coltan, diamonds, copper, cobalt and gold — as being exploited
by foreign armies in the DRC in a 'systematic and systemic' way. It noted that plundering, looting,
racketeering and criminal cartels were commonplace in occupied territories. The panel warned
that the cartels, with their worldwide connections and ramifications, 'represent the next serious
security problem in the region'. It said the private sector played a 'vital' role in the exploitation of
resources and the continuation of the war, and that a number of companies had fuelled the conflict
directly by trading arms for natural resources,  while others had facilitated access to funds to
purchase weapons. 'Top military commanders from various countries needed and continue to need
this conflict for its lucrative nature and for temporarily solving some internal problems in those
countries, as well as allowing access to wealth', the panel said. It recommends, among other things,
that the UN Security Council immediately declare an embargo on the import and export of certain
minerals from or to Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda until their involvement in the exploitation of the
resources is 'made clear, and declared so», by the Council,  and that any country breaking the
embargo should face sanctions»31.
36 Coltan, short for columbite-tantalite, is a rare ore prominent in the electronics industry,
which uses tantalum capacitors. Coltan is used not only in the manufacture of electronic
components (for armaments and aeronautics),  but also in «light-bulb filaments,  nuclear
reactor parts, superconductivity research, and as constituents in corrosion-resistant metal alloys»
32.  Coltan,  moreover,  is  used in mobile  phones  and Playstation 2.  At  the turn of  the
millennium, coltan joined diamonds, gold and oil in strategic importance. For years its
price had stood at US$30 a pound, before soaring to US$210 in December 2000 and then
stabilising at US$15533. By the end of 2000, Rwanda exported between 150 and 255 tonnes
of coltan, as against a maximum of 100 tonnes before the 1998 war began34. Coltan is often
funnelled through Bukavu, where middlemen operate, before it reaches Kigali or Kampala
en route to destinations in Europe and the US. Congolese coltan is exported from Rwanda
by Rwanda Metals, a Kigali-based company which is effectively a Rwandan army front. In
December  2000,  RCD-Goma granted SOMIGL,  a.k.a.  the  Great  Lakes  Mining Company,
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monopoly rights for the mining of coltan. The international trade used to begin with a
trip on a Sabena flight to Belgium. When Sabena stopped its coltan flights, largely because
of a public awareness campaign by Belgian NGOs under the slogan «No blood on my mobile»,
exports continued for a while via freighter aircraft from Goma to Ostend35. Further down
the line, Cabot Performance Materials (Boyertown, USA) and HC Starck (Germany-USA)
are alleged to be the chief international companies involved in buying tantalum36.
37 Commenting on the RCD's decision to take holdings in mining companies and declare a
monopoly  on  exports  through  SOMIGL,  the  movement's  Secretary-General,  Azarias
Ruberwa, told AFP: «We're not interested in the nationality of  buyers but only in obtaining
money for our movement. We realise the need to have companies to finance ourselves as other rebel
movements  do».  The  launch  of  SOMIGL  resulted  in  accusations  that  backer  Rwanda,
through the presence of its army in eastern DRC, had intensified the looting of Congo's
mineral  resources;  an  accusation  Ruberwa  shrugged  off  as  part  of  the  civil  war
propaganda. This was also the view of Rwandan government spokesman Joseph Bideri,
who  told  Reuters:  «Rwanda  is not  benefiting  materially  from  any  Congolese  resources
whatsoever. Our budget this year [2000] was a shoestring budget, worse than last year's. If the
government was getting money from Congo minerals, our budget would not be as miserable as it is
»37.
38 When the UN Panel of Experts released its report on illegal mineral extraction in the DRC,
the  accused vehemently  denied their  involvement.  For  Rwanda,  this  «biased» report
amounted to a negation of the genocide. Its presidential envoy to the Great Lakes, Patrick
Mazimpaka, said of the report: «It is as if they are saying the Interahamwe militia are not there.
There are as many as 40,000 Interahamwe...  [The content of the report] is ...  equivalent to
saying that the genocide never happened in Rwanda»38. For Uganda, the report was «gossip».
Uganda threatened to withdraw from the Lusaka accord39. In the end, though, Uganda
agreed to continue to consider withdrawal, but would «examine the wisdom of maintaining a
presence in Buta and Bunia»40. Museveni slammed the report. After he «looked into the books»,
Museveni stated: «It is true that prior to 1995 Uganda's exports in gold were reported as below
one tonne. Less than one tonne. Starting with 1995, our gold exports went to nearly four tonnes...
The reason was because of liberalisation here»41. Museveni then set up the Porter Commission
of Inquiry, which in November 2001 exonerated the Ugandan president, his family, his
government and several top military officers of the charges brought by the UN Report.
39 RCD-Goma reacted by claiming that coltan benefited the population of eastern DRC. In an
interview  with  BBC  Radio  4  (17July  2001),  Nestor  Kyimbi,  chief  of  RCD's  mining
department, had this to say:
40 KIYIMBI (VIA INTERPRETER):
41 When I tell you we have exported forty tons of coltan, you can make the calculation, and
for $4 per kilo you realise how much money has come into the government treasury. And
the RCD, it has some public obligations to cover and it is thanks to this money that RCD is
able to cover them. For instance, the RCD has to restore roads, also we have to pay the
salary of more than 30,000 civil servants, and we have some social departments such as
schools and hospitals, and we can work in those hospitals thanks to the money coming
into the treasury.
42 But Kiyimbi failed to convince his interviewer.
43 JENKINS (INTERVIEWER):
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44 According to the figures Mr Kiyimbi gave us, the taxes alone on forty tons of coltan would
raise $1.6 million. But total coltan exports from Eastern Congo have been reported in the
trade press as being around ten thousand tons a month — worth around $2 billion. If
hospitals have seen any of this money, there is no sign of it42.
45 Radio 4 interviewed a hospital doctor and administrator in Goma. He said: «The war in 
Congo, even if it started for political motives, it seems to me that it is now for economic reasons.
The different armed groups are here more to steal and loot the Congo and take its riches out of the
Congo»43.
46 The controversy over Rwanda's presence in the DRC has also caused a split in British
politics. After visiting the DRC in August 2001, the UK's All Party Parliamentary Group on
the Great  Lakes and Genocide Prevention pointed a finger at  Rwanda and laid down
conditions for the continuation of international aid to the Great Lakes region: «Attacks on
Rwanda between 1995-1998 by Interahamwe and ex-FAR militias based in Eastern DRC, and the
failure of the DRC government to prevent them, justified Rwanda's initial intervention in DRC.
However, Rwanda's security justification is now in doubt. Rwanda's military bases — in common
with all  other foreign armies in DRC — appear to be more closely linked to the positioning of
mineral mines than rebel forces. British and European bilateral aid policy in the Great Lakes
Region  must  be  linked  to  cessation  of  illegal  exploitation  of  natural  resources  and
implementation  of  the  Lusaka  Accords.  Certification  schemes  should  be  introduced,
where appropriate,  to address the exploitation of  natural  resources».  (APPG,  2001:  3;
emphasis in text)
47 The APPG accepted the critique that the UN report on the illegal extraction of natural
resources (April 2001) had been «unbalanced and flawed in some areas», yet it confirmed that
its broad findings were credible. Reflecting on the numerous eyewitness reports it had
collected during the visit, the APPG called for a vigorous response:
48 «The All Party Group has been encouraged by the Prime Minister's [Tony Blair's] mention of three
million conflict-related deaths in Congo at his Party Conference speech on October 2nd 2001. If the
deaths of 7,000 innocent civilians in America [referring to the 11 September terrorist attack
on New York] warrant the enormous response of the international community in the military and
economic sphere — and they do — then surely the deaths of 2.5 million civilians in the Congo
warrant an equally vigorous response» (APPG, 2001: 5).
49 But Britain's Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short, disagrees. A
firm supporter of the Kagame regime, Short maintains that Rwanda has every reason to
be in the DRC. I quote from the Radio 4 programme transmitted on 10 July 2001:
50 SHORT:
51 This  country [Rwanda]  is  trying to reconstitute itself.  The UK is  trying to help it  to
reconstitute itself and prevent another genocide.
52 JENKINS:
53 But Amnesty International  reports massive human rights violations,  atrocities by the
Rwandan forces  and their  allies,  the  rebel  government  in  Congo against  civilians  in
pursuit of mineral resources.
54 SHORT
55 That's false ... Rwanda is in the DRC to protect itself from the forces of the genocide, has
signed up to the Lusaka agreement which says that the international community will help
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to disarm those forces and Rwanda will withdraw, has pulled back, has led that process.
(Radio 4 Online, p.9)
56 These strongly partisan phrases did not deter Short's interviewer, who concluded very
much along the lines of the (then yet to appear) APPG.
57 On 20 November, the UN published an addendum to its April Report, in which the panel of
experts confirmed that Uganda and Rwanda (but not Burundi) continued their extraction
work and profiteering through sophisticated channels. The addendum reported that the
Rwandan military «continued to collect  and channel  profits  from trade in natural  resources
through a sophisticated internal mechanism», while the «commercial networks put in place by
Ugandan military commanders had allowed them to continue their exploitation activities despite
the withdrawal of a significant number of troops»44. The addendum also accused Zimbabwe,
Namibia and Angola. Reacting to the report, the DRC Information Minister, Kikaya Bin
Karubi,  rejected the allegation that  «invited countries» could be involved in looting.
These partners, Karubi said, were involved in signed, legitimate business agreements. As
Rwanda's  former colony,  Belgium came out  fairly cleanly,  which the Belgian Foreign
Ministry  ascribed  to  the  «high  degree  of  transparency»  which  exists  in  the  Belgian
enterprises that operate in the DRC, as in Belgium itself.
 
The year 2001: renewed hope for the inter-Congolese
dialogue
58 Coltan  aside,  2001  will  be  remembered  for  the  assassination  of  Laurent  Kabila;  the
succession of his son Joseph, who brought renewed hope for peace; the many promises of
international troop withdrawal; the making and unmaking of alliances among the rebel
groups; the UN report on the exploitation of natural resources in the DRC; the escalation
of violence, displacement and human rights abuses, especially in eastern DRC where the
political scene was becoming exceedingly complex; and the arrival of the UN mission to
the DRC (MONUC), which began to disarm some «negative forces». Towards the end of
2001 it  was  clear  that  the  inter-Congolese  Dialogue,  so  much talked about  since  the
signing of the Lusaka Accord in 1999, could not be separated from the often perplexing
complexities within Kivu. The dialogue had yet to start in earnest.
59 When Joseph Kabila took charge of the DRC, the repercussions of his father's murder were
felt particularly by people originating from the provinces of Maniema, North Kivu and
South Kivu, where scores of people were arrested and imprisoned45. In eastern Congo,
Laurent  Kabila  was  by  now remembered  for  a  short  regime  that  in  its  ruthlessness
matched  the  Mobutu  era,  and  for  his  refusal  to  cooperate  with  the  UN  during  its
investigation of the 100,000 «disappeared» Hutu refugees. Raised in Rwanda, where he
also trained as a soldier, Joseph Kabila, «immediately stated his commitment to peace through
the Lusaka Accords... [and] accepted Sir Ketumile Masire [former president of Botswana] as
facilitator of the inter-Congolese dialogue».  He took swift steps to reform the cabinet and
«called for openness and an end to the era of nepotism. He embraced talk of trade liberalisation and
an end  to  state  monopolies,  opened  dialogue  with  the  IMF and the  World  Bank,  and  invited
humanitarian agencies to assess the situation in the Congo» (APPG 2001: 7).
60 In eastern DRC, the year 2001 began with an escalation of violence between Hema and
Lendu,  a  case  of  so-called  tribal  warfare  much  influenced  by  Uganda's  interest  in
minerals.  Uganda intensified  the  conflict  because  of  its  continuing support  to  Hema
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warriors.  Agreeing  that  the  Ugandan  army  exacerbated  the  tension,  the  UN  special
rapporteur on human rights in DRC, Roberto Garreton, stated on 19 January 2001 that
«the Hema had entered areas inhabited by Lendu and arbitrarily executed 150 of them». Human
Rights Watch, too, indicted Uganda of meddling in the rivalries. Lendu then retaliated
with mass murder, possibly assisted by Interahamwe and Ugandan ADF rebels46. Although
fuelled from the outside, local conflicts like that between Hema and Lendu would make
peace more difficult to achieve.
61 The year 2001 is best described as marked by two political tendencies. On the one hand, it
emerged that alliances between rebel groups were never stable and that rivalry among
rebel leaders was rampant47, on the other, the world witnessed some sustained efforts by
rebel leaders, particularly by Jean-Pierre Bemba (MLC), to bring local political factions and
interests into the fold of the rebel movements. The former tendency, the apparent futility
of attempts to build durable alliances between rebel groups, was demonstrated in January
2001 when MLC and RCD-ML merged to form the Congolese Liberation Front (CLF/FLC). Led
by Bemba,  with  Mbusa  Nyamwisi  as  its  first  vice-president,  the  merger  immediately
proved contentious: not only was there rivalry between Bemba and Mbusa, but Wamba
dia Wamba refused to sign and temporarily quit RCD-ML. On 18 August 2001, however,
the  merger  having  failed,  Yoweri  Museveni  intervened  to  broker  a  compromise
agreement and Wamba returned to sign48. This happened just two days before a crucial
preparatory committee meeting of the IC Dialogue in Gaborone.
62 Not deterred by the fragile relationship with other rebel leaders, Bemba lost no time
trying to enlist the services of some of his area's «negative forces». Thus, in early 2001,
Bemba approached certain Mayi-Mayi groups to engage them in patrolling the country's
eastern borders. Some diplomats explained this rapprochement as an effort by Bemba to
make up military strength in light of the anticipated departure of foreign troops, in this
case Uganda49. There was no parallel to this rapprochement in South Kivu, although one
group of Mayi-Mayi there, the newly formed Mouvement de la Renaissance du Congo-Mayi-
Mayi (MRC-MM), informed IRIN «that its forces could help serve as a buffer along the DRC
border with Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi in accordance with the Lusaka peace accord and taking
into account the security concerns of the neighbouring countries.  The group said it  should be
included in all national and regional discussions on the DRC issues, including the Lusaka peace
process.  In  the  same  statement,  it  also  denied  that  its  troops  were  fighting  alongside  DRC
government forces. ‘We want to stress once and for all that we are independent of Kinshasa and of
any other player in this conflict’, the statement said. It warned that ‘no durable solution [to the
conflict] will be found without us’»50.
63 The MRC-MM offer to patrol the eastern border may have been a teaser, but it mirrored
(and preceded) Bemba's agreement with «Mayi-Mayi militia in Butembo» to end mutual
hostilities51. Of course, the latter agreement meant that new local hostilities could now
surface: the Mayi-Mayi from Butembo broke with the pattern of previous alliances and
declared that Interahamwe, ex-FAR and Ugandan ADF were the new enemies.
64 The rapprochement between Bemba and some Mayi-Mayi was repudiated by other Mayi-
Mayi,  notably groups loyal  to General  Padiri,  head of  the Parti  de  Resistance  Nationale
(PRN), also known as the «real Mayi-Mayi». Padiri explained that all rebel groups and
movements were now positioning themselves to «legitimise» their campaigns52. (This is
good analysis.)  Other Mayi-Mayi  leaders agreed with Padiri's  views and also opposed
Bemba, e.g. Mayi-Mayi «from the village of Curondo in Butembo».  This group, which for a
while held some CLF officials hostage, was referred to by Bemba as «causing confusion»,
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although Bemba appeared confident that the group would cooperate in the end53. Bemba
had more trouble with Mayi-Mayi in his territory when another group, the Resistance
Nationale  de  Lumumba (RNL),  kidnapped expatriates  working for  DARA-Forest,  a  Thai-
Ugandan  company.  The  hostages'  release,  initially  conditional  on  the  immediate
withdrawal of Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian troops, was later achieved following a
well-publicised intervention by François Lumumba, eldest son of Patrice Lumumba, the
murdered Prime Minister.  François  Lumumba praised the Mayi-Mayi  fighters  for  not
demanding a ransom; their aim had been to show the world that there was illegal looting
going  on  in  the  DRC54.  By  the  middle  of  the  year,  the  ever-shifting  kaleidoscope  of
alliances came into focus after Mbusa fell out with Bemba: Mayi-Mayi opposed to Bemba,
and other anti-Bemba groups, joined Mbusa's faction of RCD-ML. When Bemba and Mbusa
troops clashed, the Ugandan army had a pretext for re-deploying its Ruwenzori forces in
the north-eastern towns of Kanyabayongo, Butembo, Beni and Bunia55.
65 Bemba's «legitimising» agenda led to the creation of the Union of Congolese Forces for the
Integral Respect of the Lusaka Accords and the Holding of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (UFAD).
This union aimed to bring together armed and unarmed opposition groups, including
Etienne Tshisekedi's UDPS and Joseph Olenghankoy's FONUS56. Later in the year, Bemba
declared that the war had ended, that he had sent most of his Ugandan soldiers home and
was now turning his rebel movement into a political party opposed to Kabila. Upstaging
his RCD-Goma rivals, Bemba demanded the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops
from the  DRC57.  Bemba was  gaining  the  upper  hand,  as  would  be  confirmed by  the
outcome of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.
66 The making and un-making of alliances on the ground, it  must be stressed, occurred
against the backdrop of declarations of intended troop withdrawal.  Such withdrawals
were planned in accordance with UN Resolution 1341, which demanded that the Lusaka
signatories  draw  up  disengagement  plans  by  15  March  2001  and  «plans  for  a  total
withdrawal» by mid-May. Rwanda was first to announce it would withdraw 200 km from
Pweto,  Katanga  province,  in  the  direction  home.  (But  RCD troops  would  stay!)  Paul
Kagame, however, followed this up by saying that although he was withdrawing troops,
Rwanda reserved the right to defend itself should Kabila take advantage of the pull-out58.
Also calling back some battalions, Uganda too put forward conditions for full withdrawal.
Uganda's Foreign Minister, Eriya Kategaya, said: «We can pull out, but when we leave what
kind of DRC will we be leaving behind? Are the conditions that brought us to the DRC initially still
the same?»
67 No foreign power was in a hurry to leave the DRC. With the exception of Namibia, every
foreign force found a valid reason to prolong its presence and war. Rwandan-backed RCD
warned that the war would resume if Kabila did not end his support for the «negative
forces» in the east59. Kagame reiterated that the withdrawal of «all foreign forces [would] be
very much facilitated by how the disarmament of the Interahamwe [was] addressed»60. For their
part, the SADC allied forces also responded that they would «not rush» the withdrawal of
their troops61.
68 Rwanda in  particular  seemed disinterested in  pulling out.  When RCD-Goma failed to
withdraw from Kisangani, having several times disrupted the activities of MONUC62, the
Congolese government accused Rwanda and RCD-Goma of planning for a «secessionist
state» in eastern DRC63. The anxiety was fuelled by the «reinforcement of Rwandan military
positions around the city of Kisangani»,  where demilitarisation was hotly contested. RCD-
Goma's resolve not to demilitarise Kisangani was reinforced when Kabila appointed a
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governor for the city: withdrawing meant accepting the appointment, meant handing the
town to Kabila64. Rwanda, too, felt the need to stay in Kisangani as it was now threatened
by  ALIR,  a  new  «negative  force».  Made  up  of  ex-FAR  and  Interahamwe,  ALIR  was
preparing  a  major  attack  on  Rwanda.  Uganda,  meanwhile,  restated  its  intention  to
withdraw from most parts of  the country by the end of  2001,  but would «maintain a
symbolic presence in Buta and Bunia on the request of the UN and other allies, as well as maintain
some troops in the Rwenzori Mountain areas»65.
69 The DRC was most sceptical about the RCD's claim that Rwanda was withdrawing from
eastern Congo.  Its  commissioner  for  relations  with MONUC alleged that  Uganda and
Rwanda were both keen to restart the war. Of the Rwandan presence he said: « Deep within
Kivu and Katanga regions, Rwandans are occupying positions formerly abandoned by the Forces 
Armées Congolaises (FAC) in line with the disengagement plan, jumbo jets and military aircraft
are making regular return flights, depositing weapons, ammunition and war equipment along the
Pweto-Kakulu, Pweto-Kisadi and Pweto-Kasamba roads»66.
70 After RCD-Goma launched a recruitment drive in mid-August, leader Adolphe Onusumba
told Kofi Annan: «We conquered Kisangani at the cost of blood, so one cannot come and say we
should leave the town [of Kisangani] — and then we leave the town to vultures. Such behaviour
would be irresponsible on our part»67. Annan received a similar statement from the Uganda
People's Defence Forces (UPDF): we shall keep troops in Bunia and on the slopes of the
Ruwenzori  «until  a  peace  agreement  is  reached  within  the  framework  of  the  Lusaka  peace
process»68. On another occasion, RCD-Goma's spokesman Kin-Kiey Mulumba said: «We are
willing to demilitarise provided MONUC tells us what it plans to do in the event of an attack on the
city by the Interahamwe militiamen who are nearby or by a brigade of [DRC President] Kabila's
troops»69. The Kivu population might have had enough of this pointless war, but the RCD-
Goma rebels were in no hurry to wave goodbye to the Rwandan troops that supported
them. As Human Rights Watch warns, the «uninvited» belligerents, and the rebel groups
they support, «have no interest to see an end to the current situation in eastern Congo. There is a
level of violence they can tolerate because the violence is targeting civilians … The end result is that
Congolese will  continue to die as [leaders] line their pockets with gold and diamonds»;  these
leaders have a «colonialist mentality»70. Globalisation, especially the worldwide interest
in coltan and other precious minerals is the chief mechanism which sustains the conflicts.
71 In 2001, Congolese people were also preoccupied with the thorny issue of who would take
part in the IC Dialogue. In June, the DRC government stated that Mayi-Mayi were not «
negative  forces»,  but  «Congolese  nationals  who  are  fighting  against  the  slavery  of  their
compatriots, who are being violated and massacred on their own territory, controlled and looted
shamelessly by the troops of aggression and occupation»71. Joseph Kabila had already made the
point when visiting London earlier in the year72. The point was picked up by RCD-ML,
which in  September  talked to  Mayi-Mayi  militias  with a  view to  incorporating their
position(s) into the IC Dialogue. One reason for the rapprochement was that Mayi-Mayi
were responsible for  insecurity and human rights  violations in the territory RCD-ML
controlled. It was better to be good neighbours. RCD-ML claimed to be working hard to
access a wide range of views (from women, elders,  youth,  traditional leaders,  church
leaders ...) regarding the conflict and future of the DRC. Pursuing its own «legitimising»
agenda,  RCD-ML pushed for a federal  government that would promote a free-market
economy in the name of good governance73.  The participation of Mayi-Mayi at the IC
Dialogue was strongly opposed by RCD-Goma. Accusing Kabila of supporting Mayi-Mayi
and  Interahamwe  attacks,  rebel  leader  Onusumba  appealed  to  Zimbabwe's  president
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Mugabe for a sensible word in Kabila's ear. Onusumba threatened to launch an «all-out
military assault» should the situation not improve. Mayi-Mayi participation was blocked
also by the Banyamulenge organisation Shikama Peace Initiative (SPI), whose president,
Francis Shyaka, argued that Mayi-Mayi participation would be an act of sabotage. The SPI
argued that  all  Mayi-Mayi  should be «neutralised,  disarmed and tried» because of  their
«responsibility  for the  crimes  against  humanity  carried  out  against  tens  of  thousands  of
Banyamulenge and Tutsis from North Kivu»74. By the end of the year, however, it transpired
that RCD-Goma had done a U-tum on its position towards Mayi-Mayi; it had talked to
certain Mayi-Mayi factions led by Anselme Enerunga. RCD-Goma justified: «We are willing
to pay any price for peace in Congo,even if that includes integrating the Mayi-Mayi into our forces»
75. But these talks were held on RCD-Goma terms: RCD-Goma would not tolerate any direct
Mayi-Mayi participation in the peace talks76. On hearing this news, Enerunga replied: «If
we are not allowed to participate, if our demands are not taken into account, it will be illusory to
think of any kind of peace». And so it went on.
72 By the time the IC Dialogue in Addis Ababa ran into the ground, there was renewed
fighting in eastern DRC; the main belligerents, including the DRC government, were not
prepared to compromise. As the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) put it: «
President Joseph Kabila and his backers refuse to consider power-sharing through the dialogue
with anti-government rebels without guarantees of Rwanda's and Uganda's full withdrawal from
DRC. At the same time, the rebels and their sponsors, including Rwanda and Uganda, refuse to
consider full withdrawal until a transition government is established through the dialogue and
their security is guaranteed. As a result, low intensity conflict remains the preferred option for
most of the external actors»77.
73 It was a stalemate. Power struggles continued, especially within RCD-ML78, and serious
talks were yet to commence. The peace talks then switched to Sun City, South Africa,
where they commenced in late February 2002.
74 The human cost of the political stalemate is that the population has been decimated, both
directly through killings and indirectly through disease and malnutrition. The decimation
has been slow but steady. Following its visit to the DRC, the UK's All Party Parliamentary
Group on the Great Lakes concluded in August 2001 that «the conflict  since 1998 [had] 
precipitated a humanitarian disaster estimated to have claimed 2.5 million lives»( APPG, 2001: 6).
It  was  also  a  war,  like  many  others  in  Africa  today,  in  which  women  suffered
disproportionately. IRIN referred to a report by UNOCHA: «The fact that the conflict was
taking place 'within the daily environment',  without distinction between combatants and non-
combatants, had led to heavy population displacement and put a heavier burden on many women
to guarantee the survival of their children in a chaotic situation, [the report] said. The mono-
parental system imposed by such displacement was 'a source of permanent tension', and it was to
be feared that extended conflict would have long-lasting side effects in the establishment of a
culture of violence and the extension of domestic violence, it added»79.
75 The humanitarian situation in eastern DRC is gruesome. Releasing primary findings of a
study in five provinces,  the International  Rescue Committee (IRC) has estimated that
200,000 deaths must be attributed directly to violence80. The IRC also believes that one in
every eight households has experienced violent death since the start of the war in August
1998. About 40 per cent of those killed are women and children. «This emergency», the
report concludes, «is perhaps worse than any to unfold in Africa in recent decades»81.
76 A WHO/UNICEF report also shows that the vulnerability of Congolese households has
increased «in all  senses  of  the  word,  and nowhere  so  evidently  as  in health where  common
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preventable and treatable  conditions such as  malaria,  measles,  malnutrition,  respiratory tract
infections are killing, and access to any kind of health care has plummeted». The report exposes
how Congolese women are «paying an extraordinary price ... This year, over 42,000 will die in 
childbirth alone»82. Another study, by the Association Centre Femmes et Enfants pour la Paix,
ACFEP, claims that in the first half of 2001, Rwandan Interahamwe and Congolese Mayi-
Mayi were responsible for 2,300 rapes in Shabunda alone. The association stresses that «in
addition to rape, these women are victims of sexually transmitted diseases, perhaps HIV/AIDS,
unwanted pregnancies and wounds»83.
 
Give peace a chance? The inter-Congolese dialogue,
February-April 2002
77 On the eve of the IC Dialogue, eastern DRC remained steeped in turmoil and renewed
uncertainty when the recently formed RCD-National, headed by Roger Lumbala, allied
itself with Bemba's MLC. Together, the two factions moved into RCD-ML territory and
captured  Isiro  in  December  2001,  Watsa  in  mid-January  2002  and Bafwasende  on 26
January 2002. (Adding to the confusion, early reports spoke of a joint MLC/RCD-Goma
attack84.)  The  advance  by  MLC/RCD-National  resulted  in  extensive  violence  and
displacement. It was widely believed that Bunia, capital of the resource-rich lturi region,
would be Bemba's next target. In February 2002, civilians in north-eastern Congo were
also caught up in the crossfire when rivals MLC (Bemba) and RCD-ML (Mbusa Nyamwisi)
resumed hostilities. Elsewhere, civilians bore the brunt of clashes in which MLC and RCD-
ML teamed up to fight Mayi-Mayi. Alliances seemed increasingly devoid of any rationale
other than sheer opportunism.
78 The IC Dialogue proper began without the participation of Bemba (MLC), who stayed in a
nearby hotel. Bemba's main concern was that several of the opposition parties invited
were in fact «bogus groups and allies  of  President Joseph Kabila»,  which was a recipe for
outright civil war. Facilitator Masire's office, it was said, had been manipulated. Eyebrows
were raised also over the choice of the six Mayi-Mayi representatives, who, it was alleged,
had been handpicked by the Kinshasa government, RCD and MLC. The International Crisis
Group (ICG) commented: «you cannot expect genuine Mayi-Mayi leaders to be happy. You can
only expect more violence»85. There were other problems too. RCD-Goma's secretary general,
Azarias  Ruberwa,  objected  to  Masire's  decision  to  increase  the  number  of  RCD-ML
delegates from 9 to 16. Meanwhile, the war also dragged on. Very disruptive was the
attack by Rwandan and RCD-Goma forces on Moliro by Lake Tanganyika, which, RCD said,
had been provoked by DRC government soldiers. A senior MLC representative agreed and
regarded the provocation as a ploy by Kinshasa to derail the peace talks.
79 Despite its shaky start, the IC Dialogue ran for 52 days and produced some results. On 19
April 2002, an agreement was signed by the DRC government, MLC, RCD-ML, RCD-N, six
Mayi-Mayi representatives, 19 opposition party representatives and 45 representatives of
civil society. The agreement was welcomed by the UN Security Council for its «significant
progress» and the promise that it «could facilitate the [DRC's] political transition and help to
consolidate  the regional  peace process»86.  The agreement was also welcomed by Belgium,
France and the UK (who issued a joint statement in support),  and by Zimbabwe and
Uganda, both key players. Jean-Pierre Bemba, it became clear, had emerged as the great
Everybody needs good neighbours: understanding the conflict(s) in Eastern DRC
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, 2 | 2014
16
victor. He is related to the family of the late Mobutu Sese Seko and appears to have the
loyalty of many members of the former ruling class.
80 But the agreement was rejected by RCD-Goma (which controls one third of the DRC),
Rwanda and the US. The Rwandan government called the agreement «a non-starter». For
RCD-Goma, it was a «private agreement», illegal and unrealistic. A spokesperson for RCD-
Goma commented: «it [is] not possible in our country to do anything without us»87. Rwanda's
special  envoy,  Patrick Mazimpaka,  told the BBC the agreement would simply «lead to
another  war».  (But  it  was  rumoured that  some senior  figures  in  RCD-Goma might  be
prepared to accept the agreement.) Significantly, several Congolese opposition parties
also failed to sign. These included Etienne Tshisekedi's UPDS (Union pour la Démocratie et le
Progrès  Social),  Antoine  Gizenga's  PALU  (Parti  des  Lumumbistes  Unifiés),  Joseph
Olenghankoy's FONUS (Forces Novatrices pour l'Union et la Solidarité), François Lumumba's
MNC-L (Mouvement des Nationalistes Congolais) and a cluster of smaller parties (G4) led by
Mbwebwe Kabamba. In short, while one can speak of «significant progress», peace could
still be a long way off. The facilitators in the IC Dialogue had no illusions. Chief facilitator
Masire expressed scepticism by stressing that the power-sharing agreement had been
reached outside the framework of the ICD; it was a «partial agreement». South African
president Thabo Mbeki concurred: the less-than-inclusive agreement might fail if it did
not attract sufficient international support.
81 At the time this article was completed (10 May 2002), it was reported that Tshisekedi was
trying  to  form an  alternative  government  through  an  alliance  involving  the  parties
opposed to the IC Dialogue agreement. This alliance, according to RCD-Goma, had the
backing of South African president Mbeki,  several diplomats and members of the UN
Security Council. Such international support would ensure that the Sun City agreement
was  not  «a  done  deal»  and  that  the  door  to  further  negotiations  remained  open.
Nonetheless, it was also rumoured, but dismissed by RCD-Goma, that its own president,
Adolphe Onusumba, had been sacked for endorsing the IC Dialogue agreement88.  This
news  came  after  confirmed  reports  of  a  mutiny  among  RCD-Goma  troops  led  by
Commandant  Patrick Masunzu,  whose 1,000-strong Banyamulenge force,  mostly  from
South Kivu, had taken up arms against the Rwandan soldiers (between 5,000 and 7,000)
stationed in the highlands of eastern DRC. RCD-Goma's pro-Kigali elements, among them
security chief Bizima Karaha, described Masunzu's followers as «criminals and thugs»89.
 
Conclusion
82 The mutiny  by  Banyamulenge  from South Kivu,  and RCD-Goma's  response,  begs  the
question of how Rwanda justifies its presence in the DRC. On the face of it, in official
discourse, Rwanda is in the DRC to prevent genocide. But there is more. Beneath the
preventive perspective lies an equally «deep» psycho-political reason why Rwanda has no
moral problem being in eastern DRC: its leaders regard the region (or at least part of it) as
legitimately belonging to Rwanda. To appreciate this reason we can return to late 1996,
when the Rwandan Hutu refugee camps were attacked by Banyamulenge and Rwandan
(RPA) troops. At this point, Rwanda's then Foreign Affairs minister, Anastase Gasana, and
Rwanda's then president, Pasteur Bizimungu, confronted the international press with a
map of the region which depicted a «Greater Rwanda».  Although the two dignitaries
denied that Rwandan troops were operating on Zairean soil, Gasana gave the press an
«instant lesson» in history by arguing that the colonial powers gathered in Berlin in 1885
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had inflicted lasting damage on the region: in drawing up borders, the Europeans had
severed a part of the Rwandan population. Bizimungu «confirmed» this by invoking a
pre-colonial «Greater Rwanda» which included the highlands where Banyamulenge lived
and where, he claimed, they had lived in harmony with their Bahunde neighbours (See
Willame, 1997: 97 for a more detailed account of this imagined «Greater Rwanda» polity;
also  Vlassenroot,  2000).  Bizimungu's  lesson in  history  stressed -  correctly  -  that  the
colonial powers had violated the border situation twice: a first time in 1885, a second time
in 1910.  US journalist  James McKinley Jr.  reported on the lesson in history:  «Waving
placards and maps depicting the Rwandan kingdom of the 19th century, Mr Bizimungu pointed out
that the Tutsi now living in Zaire had been part of an ancient Tutsi kingdom. Their lands became
part of Zaire in 1910, he said, when European powers redrew the map».
«'[Banyamulenge] are in their homelands',  [the president] said,  'and if  someone
wants to uproot them, if someone wants to disown them, let that country [i.e. Zaire]
disown the land as well'»90.
83 Clearly, president Bizimungu had a point, but he was also quite imaginative. While he
stated  correctly  that  Rwanda had lost  North  Kivu  and ldjwi  as  a  result  of  the  1910
convention, he conveniently forgot that the Banyamulenge homeland was in South Kivu
(not North Kivu), where a sizeable community of Tutsi cattle herders from Rwanda (later
known as «Banya-Mulenge») had come to settle following a dispute with the Rwandan
mwami  (Depelchin,  1974:  68).  These  genuine Banyamulenge may have been Rwanda's
«relatives», as Bizimungu put it, but their departure from Rwanda was likely to have been
caused by discontent. The problem with the perception of a «Greater Rwanda» is that
fixed territories and boundaries did not exist at the end of the 19th century. The political
map  in  those  days  had  been  a  question  of  spheres of  influence  rather  than  rigid
boundaries. The engagements of Rwanda's central court with peripheral areas had run
the gamut from full occupation with complete administration in some areas, through to
instances  where  tribute  was  paid,  to  situations  best  described  as  outright  raiding 
(Vansina, 1962: 90-91. For further details see Pottier, 2002).
84 The situation today is not dissimilar.  The authorities in Rwanda will  not so easily be
persuaded that it will soon be safe to leave eastern DRC and restore home rule.
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ABSTRACTS
Widely  recognized as  Africa's  most  complex war,  even dubbed Africa's  First  World  War,  the
current conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo «Stems from the wave of violence and mass-
displacement unleashed by the Rwandan genocide in 1994» (APPG 2001: 6). This paper outlines
the broad contours of the DRC conflict(s) in international, national and local terms. In particular,
it aims to provide a full context to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (Sun City, South Africa, on 25
February 2002) by exploring the overlapping «local» contexts in which tensions arise. Focusing
on Eastern DRC, the paper also highlights the ever-shifting nature of alliances, and reflects on
the challenges that need to be confronted if peace is to be given a chance.
Amplamente reconhecido como a guerra mais complexa de África, e até apelidado a Primeira
Guerra  Mundial  de  África,  o  actual  conflito  na  República  Democrática  do  Congo  «tem a  sua
origem  na  onde  de  violência,  e  de  deslocações  maciças  de  populações,  desencadeadas  pelo
genocídio ocorrido em 1994 no Ruanda» (APPG 2001:6). O presente artigo esboça os contornos
gerais do(s) conflito(s) na RDC, em termos internacionais,  nacionais e locais.  Em particular, o
autor  propõe-se  fornecer  o  quadro  completo  em  que  teve  lugar  o  chamado  «Dialogo  Inter-
Congolês» (Sun City, Africa do Sul, 25 de Fevereiro de 2002), examinando os contextos «locais»
que se sobrepõem na RDC e onde os conflitos de geram. Concentrando-se sobre a RDC oriental, o
artigo  põe  em relevo  a  natureza  de  alianças  em contínua  recomposição,  e  reflecte  sobre  os
desafios que tem de ser encarados para que a paz tenha alguma chance.
Amplement reconnu comme la guerre la plus complexe d'Afrique, et même apostrophé comme la
Première  Guerre  Mondiale  de  l'Afrique,  l'actuel  conflit  dans  la  République  Démocratique  du
Congo  « a  son  origine  dans  l'onde  de  violence,  et  de  déplacement  massifs  de  populations,
déchainés  par  le  génocide de 1994 au Rwanda »  (APPG 2001:6).  L'article  qui  suit  esquisse  les
contours généraux du conflit (ou: des conflits) en RDC, en termes internationaux, nationaux et
locaux. L'auteur se propose plus particulièrement de fournir le cadre complet dans lequel eut lieu
le  « Dialogue Inter-Congolais »  (Sun City,  Afrique du Sud,  25  février  2002),  en examinant  les
contextes locaux que se superposent en RDC, et où les conflits se gèrent. En mettant l'accent sur
la RDC orientale, l'article met en relief la nature des alliances en permanente recomposition, et
réfléchit sur les défis auxquels il faut faire face pour que la paix ait une chance.
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